Winston Irvine remains innocent until proven guilty but the arrest of the leading loyalist has sparked frustrated debate on the nature of paramilitary ‘transition’.
Why is it taking so long, costing so much and entrenching proscribed organisations as community gatekeepers?
Irvine holds a classic portfolio of peace-building jobs, all publicly funded. He is a member of the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC), representing the UDA, UVF and Red Hand Commando, mere membership of which is an offence. Just organising a meeting with three or more members of a proscribed organisation is punishable by up to 10 years in jail. Yet the LCC has met senior police officers and politicians and was launched by Tony Blair’s former chief of staff. Its existence reflects exactly how our peace process is supposed to work.
Republicans complain nobody votes for the LCC because they can have no consistent complaint based on legality or morality.
We all know the reasons and excuses for this absurd denialism dragging on decade after decade. There is less understanding of how at odds it is with international practice.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) is how the rest of the world describes a peace process. It is a standardised approach to addressing the aftermath of wars and civil conflicts, developed by the United Nations from the 1990s onwards, endorsed by the EU and used in all UN peacekeeping operations.
Looked at from Northern Ireland, what is most striking about DDR is its emphasis on speed. Timescales of a year or less are presumed to complete all critical stages.
Disarmament is seen as the least significant stage, with an acceptance many weapons will not be handed in. Far more important is demobilisation through a swift dismantling of command structures, whether of terrorist groups or conscript armies. No ‘brigadiers’ are to be left with any lingering authority or recognition.
Amnesties are permitted, provided they do not ignore war crimes.
Efforts then immediately concentrate on re-integration through conventional employment. The phrase “decent work” is used in policy documents. This will usually begin with emergency job-creation, focused on building infrastructure or repairing war damage. As the economy recovers, re-integration can take a longer-term focus on moving people into sustainable employment, through education, training or loans to start small businesses.
This assistance will differ between types of ex-combatants. Teenagers are put on programmes originally developed to tackle gang violence in the United States. Former commanders are offered ‘special packages’ and ‘incentive programmes’, which sound familiar to Northern Ireland. But packages are to incentivise complete civilianisation and compliance is meant to be closely monitored and evaluated.
Responding to Irvine’s arrest, former Stormont justice minister Claire Sugden said the change she would like to see to Northern Ireland’s approach is better monitoring and evaluation of funding programmes to tackle paramilitarism.
DDR leaves open the possibility of ex-commanders having valuable leadership potential. However, it requires such people to be identified early, mentored and watched like a hawk. Could we have had an oversight body for republicans and loyalists entering politics? Stranger quangos were created.
Northern Ireland is said to be a model to the world and advice on our experience is promoted and sold abroad. We seem oddly disinterested in learning from the world in turn.
Most DDR programmes have been implemented in west and central Africa, as this is where the UN has most often been asked to step in, so the policy has become associated with the extreme economic circumstances of that region. Getting thousands of soldiers in Mali back onto the farm is obviously more urgent and in some ways more straightforward than getting thousands of drug dealers in Belfast to the job centre.
But is the psychology of reintegrating individuals really that different? The use of US anti-gang programmes and Northern Ireland-style ‘special packages’ suggests not.
When the IRA belatedly decommissioned and disbanded in 2005, under pressure from the White House, an unofficial reintegration programme reportedly occurred. Some members were pensioned off with stolen money and given advice on how to invest it in property or small businesses.
Several of these retirements went spectacularly wrong, with attempts to set up new criminal enterprises. Did the rest succeed? We cannot even learn from our own experience because peace processing requires us to pretend it did not happen - and in a final absurdity, to hope loyalists will follow its example.
When DDR programmes stall, funders can set deadlines as tight as a few months for progress. We should not consider ourselves too sophisticated to do the same.
